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Abstract
The television channel TV3 has played a controversial role in the Catalan politics
since its creation in the early eighties for its alleged partisan bias and support for the
Catalan secessionist movement. This paper examines the impact on electoral results
stemming from the exposure to TV3 exploiting its staggered expansion across Catalan
municipalities in the 1980s. We find that the introduction of TV3 increased voter
turnout in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election, but it did not have a significant
impact on the share of votes received by Convergència i Unió, the Catalan nationalist
force that has been commonly associated with this channel since its foundation.
Keywords Voting behavior · Television · Natural experiment · Catalonia
JEL Classification L82 · D72 · C99
1 Introduction
The literature on the political economy of media has grown rapidly and several excel-
lent surveys have already been written on this topic (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010;
Prat and Strömberg 2013; Sobbrio 2014; Strömberg 2015). Nevertheless, most of the
empirical research has thus far focused on highly consolidated democracies (e.g. the
USA and Scandinavian countries) and some formerly authoritarian countries (e.g.
Russia and East Germany). As Sobbrio (2014) points out, additional academic con-
tributions are needed to provide empirical evidence on the effects of media in less
explored institutional settings. Catalonia’s political context, characterized by a long-
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standing secessionist conflict with Spain, is a newfangled case study to analyze the
effect of a sub-national media such as TV3, which has had an alleged pro-independence
bias, on political outcomes. This paper therefore contributes to the existing literature on
the effect of media on politics by identifying to what extent voting results in Catalonia
can be explained by exposure of individuals to TV3.
In recent years, TV3 has been the subject of much controversy for its alleged support
for the Catalan secessionist movement and partisan bias, which has seemingly favored
the political coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU). The CiU was a federation of two
political parties representing the Catalan nationalist ideology, created in 1978 and
dissolved in 2015, that played a crucial role in the creation of the channel in the early
80s as well as its direction since then.1
Given this increased political tension, in which TV3 seems to play a main role, it
raises the question of to what extent voting results in Catalonia can be indeed explained
by the exposure of individuals to this channel. Providing empirical support to the effect
of TV3 over the last decade of political tension in Catalonia is still a challenge, due
to the fact that the whole region has been covered by TV3 since the mid-80s, thereby
impeding to sort out the self-selection problem. However, there is the possibility of
taking advantage of a natural experiment exploiting the staggered expansion of the
channel in the early 80s. Although it is true that the secessionist movement has been
more vehement in the last decade, the effect of TV3 on Catalan politics may be traced
back to the beginnings of the channel.
In fact, it is noteworthy that the emergence of TV3 in 1983—that is, in the middle
of the first two Catalan Parliamentary elections (1980 and 1984) after 40 years of
dictatorship—precisely coincided with the consolidation of the CiU as the strongest
political force in the region. The number of votes for the CiU rose from 754,448 in
1980 to 1,345,513 in 1984, which represents an outstanding increment in the vote
share from 28 to 47% (see “Appendix 1”). Admittedly, the increase in the CiU’s vote
share could have only been a consequence of the consolidation of the Catalan party
system, which had been fragmented up until then. Nonetheless, the CiU is the party
which exhibited the greatest vote share increase, which leads us to suspect about a
possible effect of this channel on the individuals’ electoral behavior, and thus raises
the need for closer scrutiny of its role.
Exploiting a natural experiment based on TV3’s staggered expansion across Catalan
municipalities during 1983 and 1984, this paper looks into the effect of TV3 on the
electoral results of the 1984 Catalan Parliamentary election. In particular, we analyze
the effect of TV3’s availability at the municipality level on two political outcomes of
interest: voter turnout and the CiU’s vote share. To do so, we implement a standard
two-periods Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model. Additionally, we examine the
impact of TV3’s availability on other political parties competing in the same election,
we analyzed the treatment duration effect of the channel on voter turnout and the CiU’s
vote share, and we estimate the persuasion rates.
As we will document later, although TV3 intended to cover the whole region of
Catalonia in a short timeframe, even before the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election,
1 The controversy about the TV3 bias has been amply covered by both Spanish and international media.
For instance, see “Catalan TV Network Reflects Separatist Fervor” by The Wall Street Journal on 8 January
2014.
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exogenous technical and logistical constraints presumably caused a delay in the tim-
ing of the introduction of TV3 across different municipalities. This implies that the
presence of TV3 in only some municipalities is plausibly exogenous to political atti-
tudes. This delay, however, did not necessarily change the ordering; that is, the initial
assignation to TV3 is not random, but it responded to the spread of the channel from
the center (Barcelona) to the periphery, in accordance to the availability of broad-
cast centers. Thus, the identifying assumption is that the TV3 staggered expansion is
unrelated to other factors that influence political outcomes once we take into account
relevant initial conditions of TV3 placement.
We find that the introduction of TV3 caused a significant increase in voter turnout
in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election, but we did not find evidence that the
channel had indeed influenced voting for CiU. Specifically, municipalities exposed
to TV3 experienced a larger change in voter turnout between 1980 and 1984, this
effect oscillates from 6.8 to 8.4 percentage points, depending on the specification.
Thus, at least in this setting, TV3 apparently played a role by increasing electoral
participation, which is a positive expected effect of a media outlet in any democracy.
On the other hand, there is no evidence to conclude that the channel had an effect on
the vote share of CiU in this election. Thus, even though the CiU’s vote share showed
a considerable growth between 1980 and 1984 (see “Appendix 1”), it cannot be said
that this increment is attributable to TV3, but it was seemingly a phenomenon that
covered all of Catalonia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief case con-
textualization. Section 3 reviews some theoretical and empirical literature on media,
voting turnout and political persuasion, and we pose the working hypotheses. Section 4
presents the available data. Section 5 explains the empirical strategy. Section 6 shows
the main econometric results. Finally, Sect. 7 presents some final remarks.
2 The timing of the TV3 entry
Once the Franco dictatorship ended in 1975, Catalan society started a long recovery
process of its identity and language. Jordi Pujol, leader of the CiU and president of
the Catalan government from 1980 until 2003, promoted two laws so that the Catalan
language started to be used in all region within the shortest possible timeframe: the
Law on Language Normalization, that regulates the Catalan in teaching,2 and the Law
that created the Catalan Corporation of Radio and Television (Hierro 2012: 90). The
idea of implementing a Catalan language normalization policy and the creation of
media system did not only come from the CiU. With some nuances, this aim was
also shared by other nationalist parties in Catalonia, however the CiU was the one
that ultimately led this project and founded the Corporation in 1983. Since then, this
political coalition has mainly managed the Catalan media.
2 See Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) and Woolard and Gahng (1990) about the effect of teaching in
Catalan language on the nationalist sentiment.
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Although the CiU wanted to take TV3 to the whole of Catalonia—and even to
other Catalan-speaking regions out of Catalonia—in the shortest time possible, the
first broadcasting, which took place on 10 September 1983 through the Tibidabo
broadcast center, only reached out Barcelona (the capital city) and some surrounding
districts. Subject to the economic and technical constraints faced by a project of this
magnitude,3 the remainder of Catalonia was gradually covered during the next two
years by setting new broadcasts and transponder centers.
Drawing on information provided by Montero (1987) and a variety of newspaper
articles by La Vanguardia from 1983 to 1985 on the TV3 coverage (see “Appendix 2”),
we identify the timing of the TV3 entry in the municipalities of Catalonia. TV3 set three
important broadcast centers before April 1984, the Catalan parliamentary election
month: Alpicat on 31 December 1983 to cover the districts of Garrigues, Noguera,
Segarra, Segrià, and Urgell. Rocaborda on 16 January 1984 to cover Alt Empordà, Baix
Empordà, Gironès, and Selva. And La Mussara also on 16 January 1984 to cover Alt
Camp, Baix Camp, and Tarragonès. Furthermore, TV3 set some transponders centers
in order to reach uncovered areas until then.
By April 1984 Parliamentary elections, some important broadcast centers and
transponder centers had not yet been installed: Montcaro, which would cover Rib-
era d’Ebre, Terra Alta, Baix Ebre, and Montsià in the Tarragona province, and the
transponders center Pic del O’rri i Vaqueira, which would cover the Pirineos area: Val
D’Aran, Pallars Sobirà, Pallars Jussà, and Alt Urgell. Moreover, many other transpon-
der centers were set to cover shadow areas.
To sum up, by April 1984 parliamentary elections, 67% (635 out of 941) of munic-
ipalities and 92% of population (or 77%, excluding Barcelona) was covered by TV3
(Fig. 1).
3 Theoretical arguments and hypotheses
3.1 Media and voter turnout
Why could voter turnout be affected by media? If the role of media is, seemingly,
providing information, there are at least three distinct theoretical perspectives that
could explain this relationship. Firstly, the basic Downs (1957) model states that a
voter, in deciding whether or not to vote, calculates the expected utility of either action
and votes if the benefits exceed their costs. Part of these costs are related to obtaining
information about the candidates and policies (Geys 2006a: 18). Then, it would be
expected that the entry of a new media source reduces these costs by making voting
less costly. Nevertheless, this rational view is not enough to explain voter turnout since
the benefits of voting are very close to zero (in part because the probability of affecting
the outcome is almost non-existent).
Secondly, a Downs complementary perspective suggests that the decision to vote
does not solely lie on a rational choice, but also individuals can see voting as a ‘civic
duty’ and thus feel morally obliged to do so (Geys 2006a: 19; 2006b: 648). From this
3 See “Appendix 2” for pieces of news about the difficulties faced by TV3 to cover the Catalan territory.
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Fig. 1 Availability of TV3 in Catalonia in April 1984. Source: Prepared by the author based on (Montero
1987) and La Vanguardia (“Appendix 2”)
perspective, the media, especially when it comes to public media, may enlarge the
feeling of civic duty and thus make voting more feasible (Sørensen 2016).
And thirdly, both decision-theoretical (Matsusaka 1995) and game-theoretical mod-
els (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1997) suggest that better informed individuals
are more likely to go out to vote. Matsusaka (1995: 93) argues that ‘the value of
changing the election outcome is higher when the voter is more confident that she is
voting for the right candidate’. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996; 1997), employing a
game-theoretic model, found that uninformed voters have an incentive to abstain and
to delegate their vote to those who are better informed. Nevertheless, as Geys (2006a:
25) points out, the central problem of the these ‘information models’ is that they cannot
explain the mere existence of voter turnout as they assume a predisposition to vote in
order to achieve positive turnout levels.
Either way, the empirical evidence brings up a different perspective: the effect
depends upon the content of the media, which might lead to either a positive or a neg-
ative effect on voter turnout. On the one hand, some empirical studies find a positive
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correlation between voters’ information levels and turnout, whether this information
is provided by radio (Strömberg 2004), newspapers (Snyder and Strömberg 2010;
Gentzkow et al. 2011; Drago et al. 2013; or television (Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfo-
geland 2010; Sørensen 2016). On the other hand, some contributions point out that an
increase in the supply of some media sources may lead to a negative effect on elec-
toral participation due to a crowding-out effect on the existing (and more informative)
media (Gentzkow 2006; George and Waldfogel 2008).
The ambiguous effect of media on voter turnout leads us to ask what the effect
of TV3 was (if there was any) in Catalonia by the 1984 parliamentary election. As
explained in the previous section, given the context in which TV3 emerged, its polit-
ical implications as well as the good reception of people to the channel, we firstly
hypothesize that:
H1 The exposure to TV3 led to an increase in voter turnout in the 1983 Catalan
parliamentary election.
3.2 Media bias and political persuasion
Theoretically speaking, the existing models of persuasion effects can be divided
broadly into two categories (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2008: 81). The first captures
rational learning and predicts that exposure to the media may have an impact on
beliefs and voting only in the short-run since voters, sooner or later, are able to filter
out any bias provided by media. The second channel captures non-rational persua-
sion and implies that exposure to the media may affect beliefs and voting also in the
long-run. Then, understanding the media impact on voting behavior is of interest not
only for politics, but also for models of belief updating; and from a policy perspective,
if media bias modifies voting behavior, deregulation of media markets might have a
large impact on political outcomes.
The general picture emerging from the empirical literature is that media bias indeed
has an effect on political views. Some outstanding cases in the literature are the impact
of FOX News in the voting for the Republican party in the USA (Albertson and
Lawrence 2009; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007); the impact of public television in
Russia (White et al. 2005) and an independent TV channel also in Russia (Enikolopov
et al. 2011); the effect of West German television on East Germany attitudes toward
authoritarian regimes (Kern and Hainmueller 2009); and the impact of the entry of
digital TV on support for Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (Barone et al. 2012). Regarding
newspapers, Gerber et al. (2009) also find an effect of The Washington Post (a left-
leaning newspaper) and The Washington Times (a right-leaning newspaper) on self-
reported voting.
With regards to the case of Catalonia, Hierro (2012: 160) draws on a panel data
in order to identify whether TV3 induced changes in national identity from 2004 to
2005; examining whether those who do not tilt toward any nationality in 2004 (i.e.
self-identified as both Spanish and Catalan) are more likely to self-identify as either
Spanish or Catalan in 2005 as a result of watching TV3. The author does not find any
effect of media on national identity. However, it is important to call attention to the
identification strategy. Due to the fact that by that time all individuals were exposed
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to TV3 (as the channel was available in the whole of the Catalan territory), there are
not a proper counterfactual group to test the impact of the channel, that is, a group
of individuals who did not have access to TV3 for exogenous reasons to political
preferences.
To sum up, looking into the influence of TV3 in the Catalan political context is a
worthwhile research question that can contribute to the literature in the field of political
persuasion. However, until now the findings are inconclusive, and therefore this case
study needs more scholarly attention. We pose the following second hypothesis:
H2 The exposure to TV3 led to an increase in the CiU vote share in the 1984 Catalan
parliamentary election.
4 Data
4.1 Dependent variables
The main dependent variables are the change in voter turnout and the change in the CiU
vote share between the 1980 and 1984 Catalan Parliamentary elections at municipality
level. The information comes from the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (Idescat).
Voter turnout is defined in this study as the share of population that cast their vote
with respect to the total number of people registered to vote, and the CiU vote share is
the number of votes for the CiU with respect to the total number of votes. Table 1 dis-
plays summary statistics. The average voter turnout in municipalities exposed to TV3
went from 57.7 to 69.7% (a difference of 12 percentage points), while those unexposed
to the channel went from 59.2 to 68.1% (a difference of 8.9 percentage points). That is
to say, the change in voter turnout was seemingly larger in municipalities that had TV3
during the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election. On the other hand, the average CiU
vote share in municipalities exposed to TV3 went from 34.1 to 64.5% (a difference of
30.4 percentage points), while in the others went from 33 to 65.3% (a difference of 32.3
percentage points), that is, the change seems larger in unexposed municipalities.
4.2 Treatment variable
The availability of TV3 in April 1984 is, in the jargon of impact evaluation, the
treatment variable of this study. Drawing on the information from Montero (1987) and
La Vanguardia newspaper presented in the preceding section, we code as 1 whether
the municipality was covered by TV3 before April 1984 (the date of the 1984 Catalan
parliamentary election), and 0 otherwise (see “Appendix 2” for more detail about
the methodology). There are 633 municipalities in the treatment group, and 305 in
the control group. Furthermore, in order to test a treatment duration effect, we code
the treatment variable as 1 if the municipality was exposed to TV3 between 4 and
8 months, and 0 if less than 4 months.
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4.3 Controls
Table 1 presents summary statistics of time-variant control variables. The group of
municipalities exposed to TV3 has on average 8878 inhabitants in 1981, while the
unexposed has an average of 1595. The share of men is similar in the two groups, around
50%, and this proportion is maintained over time. Around 88% of the population
understood Catalan in the treatment group in 1981, while the ratio is 2 percentage
points larger in the control group. In 1984, the share of population understanding
Catalan increased more in the treatment group, reaching 96.4%, while control group
had 92.9%. Furthermore, there were more non-native Catalans in the treatment group
than in the control, 16.9% in 1981 and 25.3% in 1986. Regarding education, the
three indicators (i.e. the share of people that got BUP-COU with respect to total
population in 1981 and 1986; the share of people that got a medium level degree
with respect to total population in 1981 and 1986; and share of people that had a
professional diploma with respect to the total population in 1981 and 1986) are greater
in the treatment group with about 2 percentage points. We also include a dummy
indicating the presence of financial institutions (banks or saving banks). 48.4% of
municipalities exposed to TV3 had financial institutions in 1981, while 42.3% in the
control groups had these kinds of institutions. The share increases about 3 percentage
points in both treatment and control groups in 1984. Finally, control municipalities are
further to Barcelona—the capital city of Catalonia—than treatment units. The distance
of treatment municipalities to Barcelona is on average 42.8 km, while control units
are 58.02 km to the capital.4
The inclusion of population size is suggested by the probability of casting the deci-
sive vote in the election (i.e. making or breaking a tie). The ratio of men is included to
control for possible differences in political participation related to sex. The percentage
of non-native people and Catalan speakers can also have an effect on electoral out-
comes due to differences in political views related to individuals’ origin. Educational
variables can also influence the electoral participation in the as more sophisticated
individuals are more likely to turnout. The dummy indicating the presence of finan-
cial institutions (banks or saving banks) in the municipalities is a dummy intended to
capture how modern the municipality is economically. Finally, the distance of munic-
ipalities to Barcelona might also have some influence in shaping political views due
to a geographical spillover effect, where Barcelona’s majoritarian political view could
affect neighboring areas.
5 Empirical strategy
We consider the impact of the TV3 entry on two political outcomes related to elec-
toral results of the Catalan parliamentary elections: the change in voter turnout and
the change in the CiU vote share between 1980 and 1984 at the municipality level.
To do so, we resort to a natural experiment based on the staggered expansion of
4 Figures of longitude and latitude to estimate the distance of each municipality of Catalonia to Barcelona
were taken from Idescat.
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TV3 in Catalonia. This strategy exploits the timing of the entry described in Sect. 2.
The key identifying assumption is that the TV3 exposure is plausibly exogenous to
political attitudes because the delay in the channel entry was mainly caused by tech-
nical and logistical issues. However, we still have to take into account some of the
municipalities’ initial conditions that plausibly determined the order of assignation to
TV3.
As a first approach to the effect of the exposure to TV3 on the two political outcomes
of interest, we plot the evolution of voter turnout and the CiU’s vote share in the
Catalan parliamentary elections of 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 for two groups of
municipalities: exposed and unexposed to TV3 in April 1984 (the date of the Catalan
parliamentary election, which is expected to show some impact of the exposure to the
channel) (Fig. 2). Figure 2a shows that the change in voter turnout between 1980 and
1984 was larger in municipalities exposed to TV3, where it increased by 12 percentage
points (from 57 to 69%), while in municipalities not exposed to TV3, it increased by
only 8 percentage points (from 59 to 68%). Instead, Fig. 2b shows that this is not the
case for the CiU vote share. It increased from 34 to 64% in municipalities with TV3,
and from 33 to 65% in municipalities without TV3, which represents an increase of
30 and 32 percentage points respectively. That is, CiU vote share exhibits a smaller
change in comparison to the change in voter turnout.
Additionally, Fig. 2c, d display the evolution of voter turnout and CiU’s vote share,
respectively, in the National congress elections of 1977, 1979, 1982, 1986, and 1989
for the same two groups of municipalities. It is worth noting that TV3 appeared in
1983, and most of Catalonia was already covered by TV3 in 1986. Thus, it is not
possible to claim that the tendency described in these graphs, specifically from 1982
to 1986, actually captures some TV3 effect.
5.1 Main specification
In terms of a regression framework, we estimate a standard two-periods Difference-
in-Differences (DiD) model using the following first-difference equation.
Yi,t  β1T V 3i,April1984 + β2Xi,t + β3 DistancetoBarcelonai + ν j + εi,t (1)
where Yi,t is the change between 1980 and 1984 in the political outcomes of
interest (voter turnout and CiU vote share) for municipality i. T V 3i,April1984 is
the availability of TV3 in the municipality i in April 1984, thus the coefficient β1
measures the DiD estimator. Xi,t is the change for time-variant control variables.
DistancetoBarcelonai . is the time-invariant distance of each municipality to the
Capital of Catalonia, Barcelona. In some specifications we also include district fixed
effects νj to control for potential time-variant unobserved shocks that affect all munic-
ipalities in the district.5 Furthermore, in some specifications, observations are weighed
by the potential number of voters in the municipality measured by the voting age pop-
5 In the context of this research, district means “Comarca”, the second smallest geographical unit in
Catalonia and Spain after municipalities.
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Fig. 2 Evolution of voter turnout and CiU vote share. a Voter Turnout in Catalan parliamentary elections, b
CiU Vote Share in Catalan parliamentary elections, c Voter Turnout in National Congress (Congreso de los
Diputados) Elections and d CiU Vote Share in National Congress (Congreso de los Diputados) Elections
ulation in 1984.6 Finally, 2i,t is the disturbance term. We cluster standard errors at the
district level j as there might be important within-cluster correlation.
A potential threat to the validity of the empirical strategy might be caused by the
introduction, over the same period of time, of other media such as radio or newspa-
pers that may have affected municipalities differentially in the treatment and control
groups. Nevertheless, scarce information does not allow us yet to control for the cov-
erage of other types of media at the municipality level. Regarding radio, however, the
concern can be minimized given the higher audience numbers of TV3 in comparison
to Catalunya Ràdio. According to Jones (2007: 521), the audience of Catalunya Ràdio
6 Results do not change significantly when using other measures such as total population or voter turnout.
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Fig. 2 continued
reached out 249,000 individuals in 1986 (4% of the total population of Catalonia),
whereas TV3 was about 2,047,000 (34% of the total population), that is almost nine
times larger than the radio audience. With respect to newspapers, unfortunately infor-
mation on subscribers at the municipality level is not available. These differences could
affect the political outcomes so that the results of the effect of TV3 might be biased,
future research therefore should be focused on looking into the effect of newspapers
on the election.
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5.2 Robustness check: DiD and PSM
To address concerns about the municipalities’ initial conditions in the assignation to
TV3, the estimated probability of participation (or propensity score) can be used to
match treatment and control municipalities in the base (pre-program) year (i.e. 1980),
and the treatment impact is calculated across participant and matched control units
within the common support (Khandker et al. 2010: 80). Then, in order to obtain the
propensity scores needed to define the common support and match municipalities, we
first implement a Logit model of the availability of TV3 as follows:
T V 3i,April1984  β0 + β1 Xi,t + β2 Distance to Barcelonai + εi,t (2)
where the dependent variable T V 3i,April1984 is a dummy variable indicating the avail-
ability of TV3 in municipality i by April 1983. Xi,t is a set of initial conditions (some
for 1980 and others for 1981 given the availability of information) that might affect
the TV3 placement as well as the subsequent trajectories of municipalities’ political
outcomes. For Xi,1980, these are: (i) voter turnout in 1980, (ii) CiU vote share in 1980,7
and for Xi,1981, (iii) Log of total population in 1981, (iv) Share of men with respect to
total population in 1981, (v) Share of non-Catalan people with respect to total popula-
tion in 1981, (vi) Share of people who speak Catalan with respect to total population in
1981, (vii) Share of people that get BUP-COU with respect to total population in 1981,
(viii) Share of people that got a medium level degree with respect to total population
in 1981, (ix) Share of people that have a professional diploma with respect to total
population in 1981, and (x) Financial institutions in 1981. Distance to Barcelonai
is the distance of each municipality to Barcelona. The standard errors are clustered at
district level and observations are weighted by voting age population in 1984.
6 Results
6.1 Effect of TV3 on voter turnout and the CiU vote share
Table 2 displays the main econometric results. With respect to our first hypothesis,
we find that municipalities exposed to TV3 present a larger change in voter turnout
between 1980 and 1984 (Columns 1–4 at Table 2). Availability of TV3 in April 1984
is statistically significant in most of the econometric specifications. We first run a
simple DiD regression, that is the Eq. 1 without controls and no weights, and we find
that the impact is about 3.1 percentage points (Column 1). In column 2, when we
add additional control variables the effect is still positive but it is not significantly
different from zero. The regressions in columns 1 and 2 give the same weight to
each municipality. In column 3, in order to give the same weight to each voter, we
report results from a regression where we weigh each observation by the voting age
population of the municipality. When doing so, the effect of Availability of TV3 in
7 The inclusion of both the previous voter turnout and the CiU vote share is justified as voting may be
habit-forming, namely individuals who voted in the past are more likely to vote again in future elections
and for similar political agendas (Geys 2006b: 646).
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April 1984 on voter turnout is about 8.4 percentage points. Also, when including fixed
effects at district level, the effect of TV3 is 6.8 percentage points.8
Then, it can be said that the effect of TV3 on voter turnout is statistically significant
and it varies from 6.8 to 8.4 percentage points once controlling for a set of variables.
The magnitude of these impacts will be analyzed in Sect. 6.4 through the estimation
of persuasion rates, as suggested by DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010).
On the other hand, regarding the second hypothesis, we did not find evidence that
TV3 favored the increase in the CiU vote share in those municipalities exposed to the
channel. None of the econometric specifications is statistically significant (Columns
6–9 at Table 2). At the same time, let us note that the results are not sufficiently precise
to reject relatively large positive or negative impacts. For instance, in our preferred
specification the 95% confidence interval lies approximately between 0.092 p.p. and
−0.050 p.p. (Table 2, column 9).
Finally, as a robustness check, Column 5 and 10 in Table 2 display the results
of estimating the Eq. 1 within the common support after doing a propensity score
matching. The details of this estimation, the balancing test of control variables and the
list of municipalities included in the common support are presented in “Appendix 3”.
53 treated municipalities are off the common support, while no control municipality is
off. Consequently, this specification uses 576 treated municipalities and 305 untreated,
for a total of 881. Results do not greatly change: the effect of TV3 on the change in
voter turnout between 1980 and 1984 is about 6.2 percentage points (Column 5 in
Table 2). On the other hand, there is no impact of TV3 on the CiU vote share (Column
10 in Table 2).
6.2 Additional results
6.2.1 Effect on other political parties
Although the exposure to TV3 did not impact the CiU vote share, one could still infer
that the channel could have either favored or discouraged voting for other political
parties competing in the same election. Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients for
PSC (Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña), PP9 (Partido Popular) and PSUC (Partit
Socialista Unificat de Catalunya). We present two econometric specifications for each
party, one without weights and the other one weighting municipalities by voting age
population in 1984. We did not find any significant impact of TV3 on the PP vote
share (Columns 3 and 4). However, the results are not conclusive regarding PSC and
PSUC. Columns 1 and 2 for PSC and columns 5 and 6 for PSUC show that the effect
of the TV3 exposure is positive and significant when weighing observations. For PSC,
the effect on the change in its vote share is about 4.3 percentage points, and for PSUC
8 Based on “Appendix 2”, there are only 10 districts that have both treated and control municipalities.
These are: Alt Empordà, Bages, Baix Camp, Baix Empordà, Maresme, Noguera, Osona, Segrià, Selva, and
Vallès Oriental. Thus, estimations including district fixed effects are only based on these districts. This also
entails using cluster bootstrap standard errors at district level.
9 Idescat labels as “PP” the information about votes for right-wing parties, however it is worth mentioning
that this label refers to votes for different right-wing political parties. For instance, the 1980 figure is for
Solidaritat Catalana, party that was dissolved after this election.
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Table 3 Effect on the change in vote share in the 1980–1984 Catalan parliamentary elections of other
political parties (PSC, PP and PSUC)
PSC PP PSUC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Availability of TV3 in
April 1984
0.013 0.043* −0.008 −0.031 0.002 0.028*
(0.012) (0.022) (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.014)
Sociodemographic
Change in Total
Population 1981–1984
−0.222 −1.633*** 0.026 0.169 −0.061 −0.888***
(0.162) (0.571) (0.042) (0.213) (0.055) (0.277)
Change in Share of Men
1981–1984
−0.078 −5.131 0.086 0.348 −0.018 −2.264
(0.245) (3.384) (0.172) (0.657) (0.109) −1.705
Change in Share of
Non-native 1981–1986
0.425*** 0.815* −0.102 0.101 −0.205*** 0.077
(0.104) (0.439) (0.076) (0.341) (0.073) (0.293)
Change in Share of
Catalan Speakers
1981–1986
0.143** 1.120*** 0.011 −0.038 0.023 0.504***
(0.061) (0.378) (0.023) (0.077) (0.023) (0.175)
Education
Change in Share of BUP
COU 1981–1986
−0.538** −7.550*** 0.035 1.423 0.267** −3.292***
(0.234) (1.678) (0.127) (0.859) (0.107) (1.003)
Change in Share of Mid
Graduate 1981–1986
−0.659 −0.179 0.073 −1.249** −0.092 0.360
(0.421) (1.570) (0.111) (0.607) (0.095) (0.939)
Change in Share of
Professional Diploma
1981–1986
−0.721** −1.989 0.428** −1.785 0.225 1.091
(0.310) (1.657) (0.186) (1.299) (0.179) (1.338)
Other controls
Banks 1984 0.025* 0.020 0.003 −0.018 −0.017*** −0.031**
(0.012) (0.024) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.013)
Distance to Barcelona −0.0001 0.0006 0.0008*** 0.0001 −0.0003** 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Constant −0.022 −0.077** 0.010 0.054 −0.021* −0.083***
(0.016) (0.033) (0.008) (0.041) (0.011) (0.030)
Obs. Weighted No Yes No Yes No Yes
n 934 934 934 934 934 934
R2 0.122 0.522 0.199 0.050 0.061 0.303
*** 99% of confidence level, ** 95%, and * 90%. Clustered robust standard errors at district level (in
parenthesis). Observations in Columns 2, 4 and 6 are weighted by voting age population in 1984
is about 2.8 percentage points. Exploring and explaining with more detail a possible
effect of TV3 on other political parties in this election is a relevant research path.
6.2.2 Treatment duration effect
Eight months passed since TV3 began the transmissions until the Catalan parliament
elections in April 1984, but not all treated municipalities were assigned to TV3 at the
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Fig. 3 Availability of TV3 by duration in Catalonia in April 1984
same time. In order to check whether there is a treatment duration effect, we split the
treatment group in two: those who received TV3 for a period between 4 and 8 months
and those who received it for less than 4 months (Fig. 3).
When reducing the sample to those municipalities exposed to TV3 in April 1984,
we have 235 municipalities treated between 4 and 8 months, and 378 municipalities
treated for less than 4 months. As in preceding models, we run different econometric
specifications (without controls, with controls, weighting observations by voting age
population and combining DiD with PSM). We find that there was not effect of TV3
on voter turnout or the CiU’s vote share (Table 4). Thus, we cannot claim that the
passage of time intensified the effect of TV3 on the treatment group.
6.3 Placebo tests
Placebo tests are necessary to check whether the parallel trend assumption critical in
the DD method, is plausible in this study. The first placebo uses a previous electoral
process to check whether there are pre-existing trends in the political outcomes of
interest. Since the period under analysis (1980–1984) corresponds to the first two
parliamentary elections in Catalonia, there are no previous parliamentary elections to
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Table 4 Treatment duration effect
Voter turnout CiU vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment durationa 0.022 −0.013 0.025 0.059
(0.025) (0.045) (0.027) (0.096)
Sociodemographic
Change in Total Population
1981–1984
−0.364** −0.548** 0.102 0.439
(0.163) (0.205) (0.146) (0.409)
Change in Share of Men
1981–1984
−0.074 −1.235 0.131 0.128
(0.315) (1.574) (0.243) (0.985)
Change in Share of Non-native
1981–1986
0.370** 3.885*** 0.356* −0.488
(0.151) (0.586) (0.148) (0.684)
Change in Share of Catalan
Speakers 1981–1986
0.089* −0.446** −0.195*** −0.172
(0.050) (0.141) (0.045) (0.161)
Education
Change in Share of BUP COU
1981–1986
−1.224*** −5.578*** −0.799* −4.837**
(0.296) (1.246) (0.392) (1.488)
Change in Share of Mid Graduate
1981–1986
−0.332 −4.831** 0.599 1.171
(0.232) (1.886) (0.486) (1.518)
Change in Share of Professional
Diploma 1981–1986
0.050 −0.996 −0.502 1.368
(0.317) (1.950) (0.386) (1.744)
Other controls
Banks 1984 0.039** 0.038 −0.005 0.090**
(0.010) (0.030) (0.017) (0.040)
Distance to Barcelona −0.0008** −0.002** 0.0008 0.002
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.001)
Constant 0.107*** 0.053 0.251*** 0.196
(0.026) (0.066) (0.039) (0.114)
Obs. Weighted No Yes No Yes
n 613 613 613 613
R2 0.153 0.570 0.057 0.248
Clustered robust standard errors at district level (in parenthesis). Observations in Columns 2 and 4 are
weighted by voting age population in 1984
*** 99% of confidence level, ** 95%, and * 90%
aTreatment Duration: 1: between 4 and 8 months, and 0: less than 4 months
test parallel trends. Nevertheless, we draw on the national parliamentary elections of
1977 and 1979 to check pre-existing trends in political outcomes of interest. Columns
1–4 in Table 5 shows that the treatment variable, Availability of TV3 in April 1984,
had no impact on voter turnout or CiU vote share in the change in national elections
between 1977 and 1979, which suggests that there are no pre-existing trends.
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The second placebo treatment is a variable that uses data on the posterior diffusion
of TV3 between April 1984 and December 1984 (i.e. twenty months later than the
initial treatment variable). In April 1984, 613 municipalities were treated and 323
were untreated, which is indeed the size of our main treatment and control groups. By
December 1984, TV3 had reached out to159 municipalities more. Then, we construct
this placebo variable as a dummy that takes on 1 for municipalities that were reached by
TV3 between April 1984 and December 1984 (i.e. 159 municipalities) and 0 otherwise.
If the exposure to TV3 is indeed causing the effect in the outcome, then the placebo
should not be significant (otherwise, that would be capturing anticipatory effects or
pre-existing trends).
Columns 5–8 in Table 5 show that the placebo, Availability of TV3 in December
1984, support our findings. For voter turnout, the placebo is not significant (and the
actual treatment is significant), which suggests that there are no pre-existing trends.
On the other hand, neither the impact of the placebo nor the actual treatment for the
CiU vote share are significant, which supports our findings regarding a lack of political
persuasion of TV3 in this setting.
Finally, the third placebo tests whether there is some effect of TV3 within the
control group by randomly assigning a fake treatment in this group. There should
not be significant differences between the fake treated and untreated, otherwise it
would be capturing pre-existing trends. We produce this fake placebo treatment
maintaining the same ratio of the total treated and control municipalities, namely
65.64% of treated. Then, we have got 211 (fake) treated and 110 untreated munic-
ipalities within the control group. We repeat this fake random assignation 5.000
times and we calculate how often the impact of these fake treatments is significant.
For voter turnout, when specifying the model 1 with no weights, 95% of times the
fake treatment is statistically insignificant, and 86% when weighting observations by
potential number of voters. For CiU vote share, 94% of times the fake treatment
is statistically insignificant for the unweighted model, and 92% for the weighted
model.10
6.4 Persuasion rates
Persuasion rates are a measure of the percentage of receivers that change the behavior
amongst those that receive a message and are not already persuaded (DellaVigna and
Gentzkow 2010).
The persuasion rate is defined as follows:
f  100 ∗ yT − yC
eT − eC
1
(1 − y0) (3)
where ei is the share of group i receiving the message, yi is the share of group i adopting
the behavior of interest, and y0 is the share that would adopt if there were no message.
Due to that y0 is not observed, we can approximate it by yC , the turnout in the control
10 The results of the fake treatment placebo are not reported, but they are available upon request.
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group, as long as the exposure to TV3 of the control groups is zero (eC 0), which is
the case in this study.11
The persuasion rate captures the effect of the persuasion treatment on the relevant
behavior (yT − yC), which is the estimated effect of the change in the political outcomes
βˆ1, adjusting for exposure to the message (eT − eC) and for the size of the population
left to be convinced (1 − y0).
For the case of voter turnout, the value of yT − yC is 0.07 [i.e. the average effect
of TV3 on voter turnout of our preferred specifications in Table 2: 0.084 (Column 3),
0.068 (Column 4) and 0.062 (Column 4)]. Due to the fact that y0 ≈yC , then y0 0.68,
which is the turnout in the control group in the 1984 Catalan Parliamentary election.
For the exposure rate (eT − eC), we use two possibilities. First, we take (eT − eC)
(34% − 0) if we follow the figures about TV3 audience provided by Jones (2007)
for 1986—assuming that this audience is very similar in 1984—and eC 0. Second,
we take (eT − eC) (100% − 0) assuming that the channel might affect all eligible
voters in Catalonia. Using the Eq. 3, the persuasion rate of TV3 on voter turnout in
the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election has an upper-bound of about 64.3%, and a
lower-bound of 21.9%. Therefore, it can be said that at least 21.9% of those who were
not already persuaded in the treated population changed their behavior and went out
to vote due to the influence of TV3.
Persuasion rates in the literature How large is the persuasion rate? DellaVi-
gna and Gentzkow (2010) provide a summary of the persuasion rates obtained
by salient studies in different outcomes of interest. With respect to voter turnout,
we have the following figures, which it works as reference points: Gerber and
Green (2000), 15.6%; Green and Gerber (2001), 20.4%; Green et al. (2003), 11.5%;
Gentzkow (2006), 4.4%, and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009), 12.9%. Then, it can
be regarded that, excepting for Green and Gerber (2001), the persuasion rate of
TV3 on voter turnout (21.9% for the lower-bound persuasion rate) in the 1984
Catalan parliamentary election is comparatively larger with respect to other case stud-
ies.
6.5 Mechanisms
This paper provides evidence about the impact of TV3 on electoral participation
in Catalonia in the early eighties. However, it is still necessary to understand the
specific mechanisms that enabled the Catalan channel exerting influence on voter
turnout. This is so, above all, given the peculiar historical context under analysis: the
first two Catalan parliamentary elections after about 40 years of Franquist dictator-
ship.
In order to explore some mechanisms, we run several regressions interacting
the treatment variable, Availability of TV3 in April 1984, with some municipali-
ties’ demographic characteristics. In doing so, we expect to find conditional effects
11 DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010: 5) provides a demonstration of such approximation. Assuming random
exposure and a constant persuasion rate f , the share in group i who adopt the behavior is yi  y0 +
ei f (1 − y0). Rearranging this expression gives Eq. 3. Solving the system for y0, it can be obtained y0 
yC − eC (yT − yC )(eT − eC ). The approximation y0  yC is valid as long as the exposure rate in the
control group is small (eC ≈ 0) or the effect of the treatment is small (yT − y0 ≈ 0).
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of the TV3 impact on voter turnout. Specifically, we interact the treatment with
(1) share of men, (2) share of Catalan speakers, and (3) share of population with
education (BUP COU, mid graduate and professional diploma). However, we did
not find any conclusive conditional effect of the exposure to TV3 on these vari-
ables.12
Another mechanism might be the type of content that TV3 supplied by that time.
Could it be proved that news or programs encouraged people going out to vote, as
well as voting for a specific political party? It is important to go into a content analysis
to study with more detail the mechanism by which TV3 could influence political
outcomes.
7 Final remarks
This study contributes to the discussion on the media effect on electoral outcomes in
a setting unexplored until now: a case study in which a relevant sub-national televi-
sion channel with a supposedly partisan and pro-independence bias that might exert
influence on the electoral results. The main conclusion arising from this study is
that TV3 caused an increment in the voter turnout in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary
election, but there is no conclusive evidence that the channel caused a change in the
CiU vote share, political coalition that has been associated to this channel since its
foundation.
Regarding voter turnout, unlike some studies like Gentzkow’s (2006) who finds
a negative impact of television on voter turnout as a result of a crowding-out effect,
TV3 seemingly complemented the information provided by traditional media such as
the Spanish channel TVE, newspapers, and radio, that influenced individuals to go
out to vote in the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election. This finding is interesting but
not surprising. Unlike the Gentzkow’s (2006) study demonstrating that television as a
whole could decrease turnout, a new channel with a great political significance (such as
the case of TV3) that provides lots of information to a particular region would instead
increase turnout. Additionally, this finding is congruent with other studies focused on
other type of media such as radio and newspapers (Strömberg 2004; Oberholzer-Gee
and Waldfogeland 2010; Snyder and Strömberg 2010; Gentzkow et al. 2011; Drago
et al. 2013).
12 These results are available upon request.
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On the other hand, it cannot be said that TV3 had an effect on the vote share of CiU
in this election. Even though the CiU vote share considerably grew between 1980 and
1984, there is no evidence to claim that this increment is attributable to TV3.
Finally, it is also necessary to find other methodological approaches to examine
the causal effect of TV3 on electoral results, especially in more recent years when
the controversy about TV3 has been more intense. Since the mid-eighties TV3 covers
almost the whole of the Catalan territory, therefore solving the self-selection problem
to actually identify the impact of the channel is a challenge. Furthermore, there are
much more media sources available today, which boosts competition and increases the
possibility for the population to be more and better informed. Implementing rigorous
methodological models for analyzing the role of TV3 today will help us to have
convincing answers to better understand the role of media in the Catalan politics
today.
Note: All data supporting this study are provided as supplementary information
accompanying this paper.
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Appendix 1: Results of regional elections in Catalonia (vote share
in parenthesis)
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Appendix 2: Methodological issues about the construction of the
treatment and control groups
Sources
The treatment and control groups were constructed using information from two main
sources: (1) Information on TV3 coverage from the newspaper La Vanguardia from
January 2 1984, to July 27 1985 (see table below), and (2) a report about the history
of TV3: Montero (1987). Televisió de Catalunya.
Information on TV3 coverage from newspaper La Vanguardia
Date Page Article
Monday, January 02, 1984 42 TV Catalana 1983: un año de grandes esperanzas
Friday, January 06 1984 19 TV3 llegó a las comarcas de Lleida
Friday, January 13 1984 25 El repetidor de TV3 en Rocacorba no cubrirá todas
las comarcas de Girona
Thursday, April 05 1984 23 Los hoteleros de la Vall d’Aran se quejan de las
anomalías de TV
Saturday, April 07 1984 6 Las islas Baleares quieren “conectar” con TV3
Thursday, June 13 1985 29 TVE y TV3 estudian la cobertura del Pallars Sobira
y la Vall d’Aran
Wednesday, June 26 1985 23 A partir de septiembre, TV3 se captará en buenas
condiciones en toda la zona del Pirineo
Saturday, July 27 1985 19 La po1ítca de reemisores de TV3 perjudica los
acuerdos con TVE, según Calviño
Saturday, July 27 1985 40 Calviño inauguró ayer un centro emisor en el
Pirineo leridano
Procedure
Both La Vanguardia and Montero (1987) provide information about the timing of
the introduction of TV3. Both sources give information about the availability date of
broadcasting towers and the coverage of these towers at district level in some cases,
and at municipality level in others. Therefore, there some methodological issues that
is worth mentioning:
(a) In most of cases, the information says that TV3 reached district X in a specific
day Y.
(b) Thus, if some source says that district X was covered by TV3 in a day prior
to 29 April 1984 (day of the 1984 Catalan parliamentary election), then all its
municipalities are classified as treated, and the districts that are not mentioned
being covered prior to 29 April 1984 are classified as untreated (control group).
(c) However, both sources also provide information about the impossibility of taking
TV3 to some municipalities within some districts that were covered by TV3 before
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29 April 1984 (treatment group) due to geographical issues (i.e. see articles by
La Vanguardia of Thursday, April 5 1984 Wednesday, June 26 1985).
(d) When it is possible to identify which municipalities within treated districts are
not covered by TV3 before 29 April 1984 (treatment group), these municipalities
are moved to the control group.
(e) Additionally, as explained in the empirical strategy section, a Propensity Score
Matching method is applied to make treatment and control groups more compa-
rable. After PSM is implemented, 30 municipalities of the treatment group are
out of the sample (out of the “common support” in the jargon of PSM).
Using such procedure, we construct the treatment and control groups. The result is
presented in the following table:
Number of municipalities by district included as control and treated
District Number of
municipalities
Total treated Total control
Alt Camp 23 23 0
Alt Empordà 68 65 3
Alt Penedès 27 27 0
Alt Urgell 19 0 19
Alta Ribagorça 3 0 3
Anoia 33 33 0
Bages 35 34 1
Baix Camp 28 26 2
Baix Ebre 13 0 13
Baix Empordà 36 34 2
Baix Llobregat 29 29 0
Baix Penedès 14 0 14
Barcelonès 5 5 0
Berguedà 30 0 30
Cerdanya 16 0 16
Conca de Barberà 22 0 22
Garraf 6 6 0
Garrigues 24 24 0
Garrotxa 21 21 0
Gironès 27 27 0
Maresme 30 28 2
Montsià 12 0 12
Noguera 30 29 1
Osona 51 50 1
Pallars Jussà 14 0 14
Pallars Sobirà 15 0 15
Pla d’Urgell 16 0 16
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District Number of
municipalities
Total treated Total control
Pla de l’Estany 11 0 11
Priorat 23 0 23
Ribera d’Ebre 14 0 14
Ripollès 20 0 20
Segarra 21 21 0
Segrià 37 36 1
Selva 26 22 3
Solsonès 15 0 15
Tarragonès 20 20 0
Terra Alta 12 0 12
Urgell 20 20 0
Val d’Aran 9 0 9
Vallès Occidental 22 22 0
Vallès Oriental 42 42 2
Total 938 633 305
Appendix 3: Propesity scorematching
We use a Logit model to estimate the propensity scores of areas exposed and not
exposed to TV3 (see Table below). In this model we include co-variates as initial
conditions that jointly influence the likelihood of treatment and outcomes.
Logit Model of the Availability of TV3 in April 1984
Co-variates Marginal effects
Voter Turnout 1980 1.036
(1.452)
CiU Vote Share 1980 1.137
(1.360)
Log Total Population 1981 0.813**
(.236)
Share of Men 1981 5.671
(8.365)
Share of Non-native 1981 4.305
(3.272)
Share of Catalan Speakers 1981 −2.146
(1.671)
Share of BUP COU 1981 −12.510
(13.904)
Share of Mid Graduate 1981 24.530
(20.199)
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Co-variates Marginal effects
Share of Professional Diploma 1981 −1.981
(16.260)
Banks 1981 −2.111**
(0.329)
Distance to Barcelona −0.0002*
(0.0001)
Constant −5.379
(5.129)
Prob > chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.433
N 934
*** 99% of confidence level, ** 95%, and * 90%
Clustered standard errors at district level (in parenthesis)
We estimate the scores ensuring they satisfy the balancing property within the
region of common support, which is built by dropping treatment observations whose
propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity
score of the controls. 53 treated municipalities are off the common support, whilst
no control municipality is off. Then, we match the treatment and control areas using
the default Stata Software specifications, namely Epanechnikov kernel matching with
a bandwith of 0.06. In the table below, the balancing test for co-variates displays
the mean differences for the treatment and control groups before and after being
matched. As we see, there was a significant difference in six co-variates between
those municipalities exposed to TV3 and those not exposed before matching that were
reduced after matching. These are: Voter turnout in 1980, log of total population,
share of non-native from Catalonia, share of people with BUP COU education, share
of people with mid graduate, and share of people with professional diploma. Once
matched, the treatment and control groups are more comparable in terms of the co-
variates included in the PSM.
Balancing test for control variables used to estimate propensity scores
Kernel matching
Mean
Treated Control %Bias %Reduct Bias p > |t|
Voter Turnout 1980
Unmatched 0.577 0.592 −9.1 0.208*
Matched 0.607 0.596 5.8 35.5 0.267
CiU Vote Share 1980
Unmatched 0.340 0.331 4.8 0.488
Matched 0.359 0.354 2.5 47.3 0.662
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Kernel matching
Mean
Treated Control %Bias %Reduct Bias p > |t|
Log Total Population 1981
Unmatched 6.985 6.479 34.0 0.000*
Matched 6.701 6.596 7.0 79.3 0.181
Share of Men 1981
Unmatched 0.503 0.509 −23.2 0.000*
Matched 0.503 0.508 −17.4 24.9 0.723*
Share of Non-native 1981
Unmatched 0.169 0.118 42.5 0.000*
Matched 0.144 0.140 2.8 93.4 0.607
Share of Catalan Speakers 1981
Unmatched 0.883 0.903 −16.4 0.015*
Matched 0.904 0.892 10.1 38.2 0.079*
Share of BUP COU 1981
Unmatched 0.038 0.037 6.3 0.345*
Matched 0.037 0.036 6.0 5.0 0.263
Share of Mid Graduate 1981
Unmatched 0.016 0.014 12.3 0.089*
Matched 0.015 0.014 6.4 48.2 0.173
Share of Professional Diploma 1981
Unmatched 0.015 0.012 15.9 0.016*
Matched 0.014 0.013 12.1 23.8 0.017
Banks 1981
Unmatched 0.484 0.429 11.0 0.112
Matched 0.441 0.392 9.7 11.7 0.102
Distance to Barcelona
Unmatched 4292.5 5723.1 −46.2 0.000*
Matched 4567.4 4723.4 −5.0 98.1 0.378*
*** 99% of confidence level, ** 95%, and * 90%
This “bias” is defined as the difference of the mean values of the treatment group and the (not
matched/matched) non-treatment group, divided by the square root of the average sample variance in
the treatment group and the not matched non-treatment group
Finally, the list of municipalities that are off the common support are presented in
the table below.
123
454 SERIEs (2018) 9:423–456
District Number of
municipalities
Treated Control
Total
treated
On
common
support
Off
common
support
Total
control
On
common
support
Off
common
support
Alt Camp 23 23 23 0 0 0 0
Alt Empordà 68 65 65 0 3 3 0
Alt Penedès 27 27 27 0 0 0 0
Alt Urgell 19 0 0 0 19 19 0
Alta Ribagorça 3 0 0 0 3 3 0
Anoia 33 33 30 3 0 0 0
Bages 35 34 33 1 1 1 0
Baix Camp 28 26 26 0 2 2 0
Baix Ebre 13 0 0 0 13 13 0
Baix Empordà 36 34 33 1 2 2 0
Baix Llobregat 29 29 14 15 0 0 0
Baix Penedès 14 0 0 0 14 14 0
Barcelonès 5 5 0 5 0 0 0
Berguedà 30 0 0 0 30 30 0
Cerdanya 16 0 0 0 16 16 0
Conca de Barberà 22 0 0 0 22 22 0
Garraf 6 6 4 2 0 0 0
Garrigues 24 24 24 0 0 0 0
Garrotxa 21 21 21 0 0 0 0
Gironès 27 27 26 1 0 0 0
Maresme 30 28 24 4 2 2 0
Montsià 12 0 0 0 12 12 0
Noguera 30 29 29 0 1 1 0
Osona 51 50 49 1 1 1 0
Pallars Jussà 14 0 0 0 14 14 0
Pallars Sobirà 15 0 0 0 15 15 0
Pla d’Urgell 16 0 0 0 16 16 0
Pla de l’Estany 11 0 0 0 11 11 0
Priorat 23 0 0 0 23 23 0
Ribera d’Ebre 14 0 0 0 14 14 0
Ripollès 20 0 0 0 20 20 0
Segarra 21 21 21 0 0 0 0
Segrià 37 36 35 1 1 1 0
Selva 26 22 22 0 3 3 0
Solsonès 15 0 0 0 15 15 0
Tarragonès 20 20 19 1 0 0 0
Terra Alta 12 0 0 0 12 12 0
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District Number of
municipalities
Treated Control
Total
treated
On
common
support
Off
common
support
Total
control
On
common
support
Off
common
support
Urgell 20 20 20 0 0 0 0
Val d’Aran 9 0 0 0 9 9 0
Vallès Occidental 22 22 12 10 0 0 0
Vallès Oriental 42 42 34 8 2 2 0
Total 934 633 576 53 305 305 0
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